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ABSTRACT 
I examine whether executives obtain more direct compensation from their companies in 
anticipation of deteriorations of firm performance. Using compensation data from S&P 1500 
firms, I find that top managers receive more direct compensation in anticipation of the next 
year’s poor performance. The negative association between compensation and future 
performance is most significant in firm-years in which insiders sell large amounts of stock, or in 
which top managers exercise large amounts of options, both of which are signals of top managers’ 
foreknowledge about future poor performance. Moreover, this phenomenon is more significant 
in firms with more entrenched CEOs. I also find intensive scrutiny from active shareholders 
effectively mitigates such behavior. This finding supports the managerial rent-extraction, rather 
than efficient contracting, explanation for the negative association between current pay and 
future performance. Consequently, such rent-seeking behavior is followed by even poorer long-
term operating and stock performance in the subsequent five years. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The last two decades have witnessed the rapid growth of executive compensation in 
the United States. These large compensation packages for top executives attract criticism 
from the media and investors, especially during economic downturns or when firms’ 
performances are disappointing. For example, the Warner Music Group paid its CEO a 
$3 million bonus in 2008 while the company posted a loss of $53 million and saw its 
stock fall by 25%. Similarly, Texas Instruments’ CEO received a bonus of $1.5 million in 
the year when the company’s share value declined by 54% and net income dropped by 
28% (Wall Street Journal 2009). To protect shareholder wealth, the recently enacted 
Dodd-Frank Act urges more rigorous regulations to prohibit compensation arrangements 
that could lead to material financial losses to the companies.   
While the mismatch between pay and performance has attracted public attention, 
such rent-extraction can happen even before decreases of firm performance become 
known if top executives possess foreknowledge about firms’ future prospects. For 
example, Albert Dunlap, the former CEO of Sunbeam Corp., renegotiated his contract 
with Sunbeam and received $2 million in annual salary and $75 million of options, 
immediately before the crash of Sunbeam’s performance in 1998.1 The overly generous 
and sharply increased compensation package led investors to wonder whether Mr. Dunlap 
                                               
1
 Mr. Dunlap’s original compensation package included a $1 million salary, $16.6 million worth of stock 
options and $12.5 million of restricted stock. His salary doubled from $1 million to $2 million in the new 
contract. The value of stock options he received from the renegotiation was also much more valuable than 
those he originally received in 1996. 
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knew Sunbeam’s fortunes were slipping when he renegotiated his new contract with the 
company (Wall Street Journal 1998). 
When top managers foresee deteriorations in future firm performance, they also 
anticipate decreases in their personal wealth due to large equity holdings. Such private 
foreknowledge, therefore, motivates these managers to acquire greater compensation to 
offset their future personal losses. As it is often difficult for shareholders to relate pay and 
performance across periods, managers can more easily camouflage such rent-extracting 
behaviors from the scrutiny of both shareholders and regulators. In this study, I 
empirically examine whether top managers acquire more compensation when they 
anticipate deteriorations of firm performance. Using compensation data from S&P 1500 
firms, I find a negative correlation between future firm performance and current 
unexplained compensation when there is imminent bad news about future performance.2 
The negative correlation between pay and future performance suggests that CEOs receive 
more compensation when they anticipate greater decreases in firm performance, and 
consequently greater decreases in their future personal wealth. In addition, I find that this 
phenomenon is more pronounced when insiders sell large amounts of stock or when top 
management teams exercise large amounts of options, both of which are signals of top 
managers’ foreknowledge about future poor performance (Ke et al. 2003; Huddart and 
Lang 2003). This finding provides further evidence that the abnormal compensation 
arrangements are driven by managers’ expectations of forthcoming poor performance and 
their incentive to offset future losses. 
                                               
2
 Unexplained compensation in this study is defined as the portion of compensation that could not be 
explained by current and past firm performance. 
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Although this phenomenon implies top executives extract rents from shareholders, 
an alternative explanation from an efficient contracting perspective is that the extra pay 
shields risk-averse managers from outside shocks, and thus helps retain managerial talent. 
To disentangle the efficient contracting and managerial rent-seeking explanations, I 
investigate the prevalence of such behavior in firms with different levels of CEO power, 
and those with various intensities of monitoring by shareholders. First, I find the 
abnormal compensation arrangement is more prevalent in firms where CEOs own larger 
amount of stocks and in firms where CEOs also serve as the chairmen of the boards, both 
of which are proxies of CEOs’ power in their firms. These results suggest that top 
managers may use their power to influence the compensation committee to receive more 
pay when they anticipate deterioration of performance in the future. Second, I use the 
presence of block shareholders (i.e., those who own more than 5% of shares) and the size 
of shares held by block shareholders as proxies for shareholder scrutiny of the 
management. My analysis shows that the presence of block shareholders and their 
shareholdings significantly mitigates the negative correlation between pay and future 
performance. Therefore, my findings are more consistent with managerial rent-extraction, 
rather than an efficient contracting explanation, for the observed phenomenon. 
Last, I explore the long-term performance implications of this phenomenon and 
find that firms in which CEOs receive excess compensation preceding poor performance 
continue to experience worse operational and stock performances compared to their peers, 
in the subsequent five years. One plausible explanation is that the excess pay represents 
more severe agency problems, which ultimately lead to poorer performance in the long-
run. Another potential explanation is that these CEOs expect poor performance to persist 
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longer, and hence have stronger incentives to acquire more compensation to offset future 
losses. Both explanations suggest the phenomenon documented in this study predicts 
poor firm performance in the long-run. 
This study contributes to the executive compensation literature and practice in 
three ways. First, prior research finds that managers sell their stock holdings or exercise 
options when they anticipate a crash of firm performance in the future. This is the first 
study that demonstrates that, besides these channels, managers also acquire more 
remuneration directly from shareholders to offset anticipated losses in the future. Such 
behavior represents direct wealth transfer from shareholders to managers, which 
excessively reduces shareholder wealth during economic downturns. Second, this paper 
sheds new light on our understanding of the relation between pay and performance. Most 
prior studies examine whether and how current compensation correlates with future 
performance. For example, Hanlon at al. (2003) and Ittner et al. (2003) both show a 
positive association between equity grants and performance, while Malmendier and Tate 
(2009) shows a negative correlation for superstar CEOs. This paper provides an 
alternative view that top executives themselves influence the compensation process when 
they possess information about a firms’ future performance. 
Third, this paper has important implications for both practitioners and regulators. 
Congress recently enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to reform the financial markets and 
corporate governance in the United States. The Act compels the SEC and other regulators 
to set more rigorous regulations on the disclosure of executive/employee compensation 
that will allow shareholders and regulators to limit excessive compensation, fees or 
benefits, and to prohibit compensation arrangements that could lead to material financial 
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loss to the company. While regulators and investors have focused their attention on the 
contemporaneous mismatch of pay and performance, this study suggests that top 
managers’ rent-extraction can be inter-temporal, due to their information advantage over 
shareholders. Investors and regulators should thus pay attention not only to the mismatch 
of pay and performance in the same period, but also to abnormally large compensation 
packages arranged prior to deteriorations of firm performance. Although such rent 
extraction can only be determined ex post, abnormally large compensation arrangements 
could raise important “red flags” for investors, who should then closely scrutinize 
managers’ behavior and monitor subsequent firm performance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review 
of related literature. Section III describes the research design and variable measurements. 
Section IV presents major empirical results, as well as a discussion of alternative 
explanations. Section V presents sensitivity analyses. The paper concludes in Section VI. 
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Chapter 2 
RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Executives’ Private Information and Rent Extraction 
Information asymmetry between principals and agents represents one of the most 
significant issues in modern corporations. Agency problems arise when agents possess 
private information about the firms they manage. Prior studies have documented various 
channels through which managers use their informational advantage to extract rent or 
transfer wealth from shareholders. One strand of literature examines insider trading, in 
which insiders use their private information to trade and beat the market. For example, 
Ke et al. (2003) document that insiders use their foreknowledge of future earnings to sell 
stocks before the “break” of a string of consecutive earnings increases. Specifically, they 
find that insiders’ stock sales increase three to nine quarters prior to a break of 
consecutive increases in quarterly earnings, but return to normal in the two quarters 
immediately preceding the break to avoid legal jeopardy. Similarly, Huddart et al. (2007) 
find insiders trade most heavily on their foreknowledge of information in forthcoming 
10-K or 10-Q filings, but avoid trading before quarterly earnings announcements to 
reduce the risk of legal jeopardy. Besides accounting information, insiders may also 
benefit from private information regarding a firm’s significant strategic movements or 
operational activities. For example, the releases of ground-breaking new products or 
patents are vital to companies in the information technology, biochemistry and 
pharmaceutical industries. These events are usually followed by huge fluctuations in 
stock price because they convey crucial information about firms’ future strategic 
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advantages and operating performance. Ahuja et al. (2005), therefore, find that managers 
buy stocks well before the filing of important patents. Lastly, Frankel and Li (2004) find 
that insider trading activities and their profitability are conditioned on their firms’ 
information environment. Specifically, they find that more analysts following a company 
and more informativeness of financial statements reduce information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders, thereby reducing the profitability and frequency of insider trading 
activities. 
Besides insider trading, another strand of literature examines whether and how 
managers use their private information to time the market in granting or exercising 
options. For example, Yermack (1997) finds stock price increases shortly after executives’ 
option awards, which suggests that managers influence boards to award options right 
before the release of favorable news. While Yermack’s (1997) finding is more applicable 
to firms without fixed award schedules, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) focus on those with 
fixed option award schedules and find that managers opportunistically manage the timing 
of voluntary disclosure to maximize their option value. Besides the timing of option 
grants, some studies examine whether insiders use their private information to time the 
exercise of stock options. Huddart and Lang (2003) analyze the exercise decision of over 
50,000 employees from seven companies. They find the timing of option exercises of 
both top executives and junior employees can be used to predict future abnormal stock 
return. The finding suggests that these employees possess and benefit from private 
information about the movement of their companies’ stock prices. Bartov and Mohanram 
(2004) examine accounting performance before and after large option exercise by top 
managers, and find abnormally positive earnings in the pre-exercise period, followed by 
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disappointing earnings performance in the post-exercise period. They also find that the 
disappointing earnings performance in post-exercise periods represents a reversal of 
earnings inflation in the pre-exercise period. The findings, taken together, suggest that 
managers manage earnings upward prior to option exercises. 
These studies suggest that when top managers possess foreknowledge about their 
firms’ forthcoming poor performance, they will sell their stock holdings (Ke et al. 2003) 
or exercise their stock options (Bartov and Mohanram 2004) before the crash of stock 
price. Since nowadays most executives’ wealth is closely tied to their firms’ value due to 
extensive use of equity compensation, selling stocks and exercising options represent two 
channels through which managers can reduce the loss of their personal wealth. However, 
the risk of legal jeopardy and active investors/directors’ scrutiny restrict the amount and 
frequency of insider trading and option exercises. Moreover, many compensation 
contracts mandate that executives maintain a certain level of equity holdings, further 
limiting the degree to which executives can shield themselves from losses via the two 
channels discussed above. In contrast to these prior studies, this paper contributes to the 
literature by examining a third channel through which managers extract rent—by 
influencing the compensation packages when they anticipate deteriorations of firm 
performance in the near future. 
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2.2 Managerial Power Hypothesis on Executive Compensation 
Over the last two decades, executive compensation has become a popular topic in 
economics, finance and accounting literature. The majority of research utilizes a 
principal-agent approach and presumes that the observed contracts are optimal outcomes 
of arms-length transactions and negotiations between shareholders and managers. The 
optimal contracting approach has generated fruitful findings that help us understand the 
complex relationship between executive incentive, compensation, and firm performance. 
This approach, however, leaves some unanswered questions regarding compensation 
practices, urging researchers to seek alternative theories or models to fill the gap in the 
literature. 
A small yet growing body of literature tries to answer these puzzles by assuming a 
different hypothesis; namely, that top managers have significant influence over the 
boards to determine their own compensations (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and Fried 
2004). This line of literature complements the traditional optimal contracting perspective 
of compensation, and explains compensation arrangements that serve top managers’ 
private interests. Therefore, Weisbach (2007) suggests that developing models of optimal 
contracting with management rent-seeking incentives would contribute to the existing 
literature. The fundamental assumptions underlying the managerial power perspective 
include the following: (1) top executives prefer more rather than less compensation, and 
(2) they are able to influence both the level and structure of their compensation packages. 
However, managerial power theory does not imply that top executives can increase their 
compensation without limit. An important constraint comes from investors’ “outrage” 
over the executives’ pay packages. If managers cannot appropriately camouflage or 
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justify their excess pay, upset investors might tighten the compensation policy, increase 
scrutiny of the management, or even replace the managers. Thus, the extent to which top 
managers can extract rent is constrained by the potential outrage costs their rent-seeking 
behavior would cause (Bebchuk et al. 2002). 
Although Murphy (2002) argues the managerial power argument is “sufficiently 
vague as to be irrefutable,” it does provide reasonable explanations for some phenomena 
that conflict with predictions from optimal contracting models. For example, Faulkender 
and Yang (2010) investigate the composition of compensation peer groups and find that 
firms tend to select highly paid peers to justify their CEOs’ compensation. They also find 
this effect more significant in firms where CEOs have greater influence over the boards 
(i.e., CEOs who serve as chairmen and those with longer tenure) and where directors are 
busy serving on multiple boards. Similarly, Gong et al. (2011) examine the selection of 
relative performance measure (RPE) peer groups to determine compensation. They find 
that firms tend to select peers that are expected to perform poorly, based on analysts’ 
target price forecasts, suggesting a self-serving bias in peer group selection to inflate 
firms’ relative performance and managers’ pay checks. Both studies show executives 
have significant influence on the selection of compensation peers to increase and justify 
their compensation packages.  
Since top executives have the power to influence the compensation determination 
process, it is likely that they might try to acquire more compensation to offset losses in 
personal wealth when they foresee forthcoming bad news with respect to firm 
performance. First, managers can more easily camouflage and justify their generous pay 
packages prior to the deterioration of firm performance than when investors are already 
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aware of poor firm performance. Second, when top managers foresee sharp decreases in 
performance, they also expect a higher probability of management turnover and a 
shortened employment horizon (Matĕjka et al. 2009). The shortened work horizon 
encourages executives to care less about investors’ potential outrage regarding their 
abnormal compensation arrangements, since they are likely to be replaced due to poor 
firm performance. 
In sum, top executives have incentives to acquire more direct compensation from 
their companies when they anticipate poor, future firm performance. They also have 
opportunities to do so due to their ability to influence the compensation determination 
process, the informational advantage they possess over investors, and a shorter expected 
employment horizon. Such behavior, however, has not been previously examined. This 
paper thus fills the gap in the literature by empirically examining this managerial rent-
extracting behavior prior to deteriorations in firm performance. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection 
My sample starts from the intersection of ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP 
during the period between 1993 and 2005.3 4  I obtain CEO compensation data from 
ExecuComp, which includes companies from the S&P 1500 indices starting from 1992. 
Stock return and accounting variables are drawn from CRSP and Compustat, respectively. 
Merging the three databases yields a sample of 21,312 firm-years. A total of 14,419 firm-
year observations have non-missing values for all variables required in my major 
regression model. Furthermore, I exclude observations of CEOs that did not stay in their 
positions for the whole fiscal year. The final sample contains 13,479 observations. 
3.2 Empirical Model and Variable Measurement 
The ideal method of testing the hypothesis is to examine the correlation between 
CEOs’ private information about their firm’s future prospects and CEOs’ compensation 
unexplainable by current and past performance. However, CEOs’ foreknowledge about 
future prospects is not observable to outsiders or researchers. Following prior studies (Ke 
et al. 2003; Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Fahlenbrach et al. 2010), I use firms’ actual 
                                               
3
 Although the compensation data in ExecuComp is available starting from 1992, my sample period starts 
from 1993 due to the use of change model in my analysis. 
4
 The regulation on compensation information reporting has significantly changed since 2006. For example, 
executives’ stock and option awards are required to be evaluated and reported at grant-date fair value 
starting from 2006. Because the compensation information in these two periods is not comparable, I only 
include firm-year observations before the regulation change in 2006. But my major findings remain the 
same even I expand the sample period to 2008. 
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future performance as a proxy of executives’ foreknowledge about future performance. 5 
Similar to the model used by Hayes and Schaefer (2000), my analysis comprises the 
following three steps: 
(1) regressing current compensation on current and past performance, 
(2) regressing future performance on current performance, and 
(3) regressing the residuals from step (1) on the residuals from step (2). 
The residuals from step (1) represent the part of compensation that could not be 
explained by current and past firm performance. This part of compensation might be 
determined by top executives and boards of directors’ private information about firms’ 
current performance that is not observable to outsiders, or future prospects. The residuals 
from step (2) represent the part of future performance that cannot be explained by current 
and past performance. In step (3), the correlation between unexplained compensation and 
unexpected future performance suggests information about future firm performance has 
been incorporated into executives’ compensation determination processes. 
The three-step procedure is equivalent to regressing current compensation on 
future and current performance, as shown in model (1). The one-year-ahead abnormal 
stock return is the proxy of future firm performance.6 
  
                                               
5
 There is a growing body of literature that uses future performance as a proxy of managers or directors’ 
private information about firms’ future prospects (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al. 2010).  
6
 In a sensitivity analysis I use one-year-ahead accounting return as an alternative measure of future 
performance. The major findings hold using this alternative variable. 
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∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 Abn_RET t+1 + β2 D t+1 + β3  Abn_RET t+1 *D t+1 + β4 ∆ ROA t   
+ β5 ∆ ROA t+1,t+3  + β6 RET t  + β7 RET t+1,t+3  + β8 Size t  + β9 ME/BE t  
+ β10 Leverage t + β11 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t       (1)      
           
In model (1), the dependent variable ∆ TotalComp t is the change in total direct 
compensation from t-1 to t, scaled by base salary in t-1. 7  I use the total direct 
compensation defined in ExecuComp as the measure of CEO’s compensation, including 
salary, cash bonus, long-term incentive plan, value of restricted stock and option grants, 
and other pays. Abn_RETt is the abnormal stock return in fiscal year t+1, estimated from 
Fama and French’s (1993) three factor model.8 Dt+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
Abn_RETt+1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. I include current and past accounting and stock 
performances to control the performance-based compensation. RETt is the twelve-month 
compounded stock return in fiscal year t. I include the change of a firm’s return on asset 
from t-1 to t (∆ ROA t) as another variable for current firm performance. I also control the 
average accounting and stock performance in the past three years (∆ ROA t-1,t-3 and  RET t-
1,t-3, respectively).9 
To control for variation in firm characteristics, I include firm size, market to book 
ratio, and leverage as control variables in the model. Size t is the natural log of total assets 
at the beginning of year t. ME/BE t is the market value of equity divided by book value of 
                                               
7
 The salary deflator provides an intuitive measure of the change in compensation, which allows me to 
interpret results more meaningfully. The measure is also consistent with prior studies, such as Baber et al. 
(1996) and Matsunaga and Park (2001). 
8
 I use abnormal stock return because it better represents idiosyncratic factors that are not anticipated by the 
market, but might be foreseen by top managers. In the sensitivity analyses, I use raw return and market- or 
industry- adjusted return as alternative measures of managers’ private information. The major findings hold. 
9
 Leone et al. (2006) document an asymmetric relation between compensation and stock return. In a 
robustness test, I include the current bad news dummy Dt and its interaction with current stock return RETt 
to control the impact of potential correlation between current and future bad news. The results remain 
unchanged. 
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equity, measured at the beginning of year t. Leverage t is the ratio of total liability to total 
assets, measured at the beginning of year t. Last, I include lagged compensation, 
TotalComp t-1, to control for the potential mean reversion of firm performance (and thus 
compensation). The model is estimated with both industry and year fixed effects. To 
reduce potential heteroskedasticity problems, I estimate standard errors with clusters of 
firm and year. 
This paper differs from Hayes and Schaefer (2000) in that I hypothesize an 
asymmetric relation between current unexplained compensation and future performance. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, when there is good news in t+1, current unexplained 
compensation is positively correlated with future performance due to unobservable non-
financial measures used implicitly in the compensation determination (Hayes and 
Schaefer 2000). In contrast, when managers have foreknowledge about future poor 
performance, top managers may exert their influence over board members to obtain more 
compensation. Therefore, I expect to find a positive β1, a negative β3 and a negative (β1 
+β3) in model (1).10  
  
                                               
10
 In Figure 1, β1 is the slope of the dotted line. β3 is the difference in slopes of the dotted line and the solid 
line. (β1 +β3) represents the slope of the solid line. 
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Chapter 4 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for major variables in my analysis. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to reduce the impact of 
extreme observations. The average change in total compensation (∆ TotalComp t) is 0.40, 
indicating CEOs in my sample on average receive an annual increase of total 
compensation as 40% of their base salary. This finding is consistent with the public’s 
common criticism of top managers’ ever-rising paychecks in recent years. The median 
(0.27) is lower than the mean, suggesting a right-skewed distribution of ∆ TotalComp t. It 
also implies that paychecks increase even more quickly for a small group of CEOs. The 
mean of D t+1 is 0.52, indicating that roughly 52% of the observations have negative stock 
returns in the subsequent year.  
 
4.1 Do CEOs receive more compensation prior to poor performance? 
Table 2 presents the regression results of Model (1). Column (1) in Table 2 shows 
the pooled regression result. The coefficient on Abn_RET t+1 is positive and significant 
(β1=1.22, t=5.42, p<0.01), which supports Hayes and Schaefer’s (2000) finding that 
unexplained compensation is positively correlated with future performance because of the 
use of non-financial measures that lead future financial performance. Consistent with my 
expectation, I find a negative and significant coefficient on Abn_RET t+1 * D t+1 (β3= -
3.37, t=-7.47, p<0.01), suggesting an asymmetric correlation between unexplained 
compensation and future performance: the slope is significantly lower when there is bad 
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news, compared to when there is good news in the next period. Furthermore, β1+β3 equals 
-2.15 and is significantly negative (F=31.85, p<0.01). The negative β1+β3 implies that 
when there is forthcoming bad news, CEOs get more unexplained compensation the 
worse the performance in the next year.  
Column (2) reports the results from Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) two-step 
procedure. 11   The Fama-MacBeth procedure is a common approach to control for 
potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in residuals in accounting and finance 
research. Results from the Fama-MacBeth procedure are consistent with findings from 
the pooled regression model. Column (3) reports the result from a model that controls 
year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm.12 The findings 
hold using the fixed effect model. 
The point estimates imply that the CEO with median salary at a firm with median 
market capitalization receives approximately $114,100 in additional compensation when 
he/she anticipates the firm value will decrease by 10% in the next year, or 74 cents of 
additional pay per $1,000 decrease in shareholder wealth in the next year. The result is 
economically significant in terms of shaping top executives’ incentive. In particular, 
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) document that an average executive loses 1.15 dollar (60 
cents) for every $1,000 loss in shareholder wealth due to firm-specific (industry-level or 
market-wide) factors. My finding shows the additional compensation CEOs receive in the 
current year significantly offsets these top managers’ losses due to poor firm performance 
                                               
11
 In the first step, cross-sectional regressions are used to obtain estimates of the parameters, year-by-year. 
In the second step, the time series of these estimates are used to calculate final estimates for parameters and 
standard errors with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation to compute t-statistics.  
12
 I control firm clusters in the model because compensation policies vary significantly across firms. An 
alternative model that uses two-way clustering (i.e., firm and year clusters) gives similar results. 
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in the next year. 13 Although the amount of additional compensation is relatively small 
compared to shareholders’ losses, it significantly alters the relation between executives’ 
pay and firm performance, and thus may affect executives’ decisions and behaviors. 
In sum, using these three different approaches, I find consistent evidence that 
supports my expectation. First, I find a significantly asymmetric relation between current 
unexplained change in compensation and future performance. Second, when there is bad 
news in the future, the correlation between unexplained change in compensation and 
future performance is negative and significant. Such negative correlation suggests that 
some CEOs acquire more compensation when they anticipate low future firm 
performance. 
 
4.2 Managers’ Private Foreknowledge about Future Performance 
To validate the link between top executives’ foreknowledge about future 
prospects and their compensation arrangements, I examine whether the rent-extraction is 
more pronounced in subsamples where there is clear evidence that managers possess 
foreknowledge about firms’ future performance. Prior studies have documented that 
executives are likely to sell their stock holdings (Ke et al. 2003) or exercise options 
(Huddart and Lang 2003) when they anticipate sharp decreases in firm performance. 
Therefore, selling a large amount of stock or exercising a large amount of options 
                                               
13
 Garvey and Milbourn’s estimation only includes direct compensation (i.e., excludes changes in managers’ 
equity holding value), and systematically underestimates the pay-performance sensitivity compared to that 
documented in Jensen and Murphy (1990), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Milbourn (2003). However, 
Garvey and Milbourn’s finding is more comparable to mine because my study focuses on the determination 
of direct compensation as well.  
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immediately before poor firm performance signal that these managers likely anticipate 
the deterioration of firm performance. Thus, unusual compensation arrangements should 
be more pronounced in the subsamples with large amounts of insider selling or option 
exercise prior to bad performance, if the large compensation packages are driven by 
managers’ foreknowledge about their companies. 
Table 3 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for insider trading activities and the 
amount of managers’ option exercise. Panel B presents the association between CEOs’ 
abnormal compensation and insider trading activities. In columns (1) and (2), I split the 
sample according to CEOs’ trading activities in year t. Column (1) shows the results for 
firm-years with CEO net selling, while column (2) for those with CEO net purchasing. 
According to prior literature, managers tend to sell (buy) large amounts of stock when 
they are pessimistic (optimistic) about their firms’ future prospects. Thus, if the rent-
extracting behavior is driven by managers’ foreknowledge about the future, it should be 
more pronounced in firm-years when CEOs sell their stocks, but less significant or 
insignificant for those firm-years with CEO net purchasing. Consistent with my 
expectation, I find that the asymmetric correlation between current unexplained 
compensation and future performance is most significant in firm-years with CEO net 
selling (β3= -5.84, t= -3.08), but insignificant for those with CEO net purchasing. The 
negative correlation between unexplained compensation and future poor performance is 
also very significant for those with CEO net selling (β1+β3= -5.64, F= 6.95, p<0.01), but 
insignificant for those with CEO net purchasing of stocks. Columns (3) to (4) report the 
results when I split the sample by non-CEO officer insiders’ stock trading activities in 
year t. The results are similar: the negative association between pay and future 
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performance is only significant in firm-years in which other officers sell large amount of 
stocks. 
Table 3 Panel C shows the results for firm-years with different amounts of options 
exercised by the top management team in year t. Similar to the insider trading story, large 
amounts of option exercise immediately before poor performance can be a signal that 
these managers anticipate decreases in performance. Consistent with my expectation, I 
find the phenomenon most significant in firm-years with managers exercising large 
amounts or large portions of their exercisable options on hand. Taken together, the 
finding implies the abnormal compensation arrangements are driven by managers who 
anticipate forthcoming poor performance. 
 
 
4.3 Managerial Power versus Efficient Contracts 
Two competing arguments may explain the negative correlation between pay and 
future performance in top executives’ compensation. The first argument comes from 
managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al. 2002) that suggests top managers take 
advantage of their private information over shareholders and exploit rents from their 
firms. Such agency conflict is magnified when agents foresee decreases in their wealth in 
near future and thus have stronger incentive to obtain more compensation to smooth 
future consumption. However, an alternative perspective from efficient contracting 
perspective may also explain this phenomenon. The boards may give CEOs extra pay to 
insulate them from the impact of uncontrollable economy-wide or industry-wide shocks. 
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Reducing such unnecessary risk exposure helps firms retain valuable managerial talents 
(Bizjak et al. 2008). 
One way to disentangle the two competing explanations is to examine how 
managers’ power and corporate governance quality affect the prevalence of the observed 
phenomenon. If managerial rent-extraction leads to the observed pattern, I expect the 
phenomenon is less prevalent in firms with weaker managerial power, or in firms with 
stronger corporate governance, and vice versa. In contrast, if the phenomenon is 
consistent with the efficient contracting explanation, I may not observe significant 
differences across firms with various intensity of corporate governance or CEO power. 
 
4.3.1 CEO Entrenchment 
 
Table 4 presents the results for firms with different degrees of CEO entrenchment. 
In particular, I use two variables to measure CEOs’ power over boards of directors. First, 
I estimate the value of each CEO’s stock holdings at the beginning of each fiscal year. I 
then split the sample into three subsets by the value of CEO’s stock holdings, year by 
year. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of CEOs’ stock holdings. Column (1), (2) 
and (3) in Panel B present the results for subsets of firms in which CEOs hold large (top 
25%), medium (middle 50%) and small (bottom 25%) amounts of company stock, 
respectively. Result shows that β3 is significant in subgroups of CEOs with large and 
medium, but not small, amounts of stock holdings. Moreover, β1+β3 is significantly 
negative only in subgroups with large and medium CEO stock holdings (β1+β3 equals -
3.82 and -2.46, respectively, both with p<0.01), but insignificant for CEOs who own 
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relatively fewer stocks. The magnitude also decreases monotonically from the subgroup 
with the largest stock holding (-3.82) to the subgroup with the lowest stock holding (0.31). 
CEO-Chairman duality is another commonly used measure of CEO entrenchment. 
Prior literature documents CEOs who also serve as the chairmen of their companies have 
dominating power over the boards of directors (Rechner and Dalton 1991). Following 
this line of research, I split my sample by CEO-Chairman duality to examine how the 
phenomenon differs between the two groups. The result shows that the asymmetric 
correlation is only significant for dual CEOs (β3=-0.37, t=-2.19, p<0.05). Moreover, the 
magnitude of the negative association between CEO compensation and future bad 
performance is greater for dual CEOs (β1+β3=-2.17, F=17.10, p<0.01), compared to non-
dual CEOs (β1+β3=-1.32, F=2.94, p<0.1). 
Taken together, the results suggest that CEOs who hold more stocks of their 
companies or who serve as the chairmen have greater power to acquire more 
compensation when they anticipate forthcoming bad performance. This finding is 
consistent with the managerial power hypothesis that top executives use their power to 
opportunistically extract more compensation from shareholders (Bebchuk et al. 2002). 
 
4.3.2 Shareholders’ Monitoring Strength 
While corporate governance has various aspects, shareholders’ monitoring 
strength is the most relevant one in this study, because it directly associates with the 
potential “outrage cost” managers need to consider. Prior studies document that large-
block shareholders (i.e., shareholders who own at least 5% of shares) play a significant 
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role in corporate governance because such “blockholders” have a stronger incentive and 
more expertise to scrutinize top management’s decisions and compensation packages 
(Gilson 1990; Barclay and Holderness 1991). Therefore, the presence of block 
shareholders and the size of their holdings are often used as proxies of governance 
strength. Following this line of research, I use the number of block shareholders and the 
percentage of shares held by blockholders as alternative measures of shareholders’ 
monitoring strength.14 
Table 5 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for blockholder variables. Panel B 
presents the results for subgroups with different levels of shareholder monitoring 
intensity. First, I split the sample by the number of large-block shareholders (see columns 
(1), (2) and (3) for results). Consistent with my expectation, the negative correlation 
between pay and future performance is most significant in firms with the fewest (bottom 
25%) block shareholders (β1+β3= -4.50, F=6.56, p<0.01), but is insignificant in firms 
with the largest (top 25%) amounts of block shareholders. This finding suggests that 
large-block shareholders monitor top managers’ compensation packages more closely, 
thereby mitigating managers’ rent-extracting behavior. Second, I split the sample by the 
percentage of shares held by block shareholders (see columns (4), (5) and (6) for results). 
The results are consistent with my previous findings: the phenomenon is most prevalent 
and significant in firms with the lowest percentage of shares being held by block 
shareholders, but is insignificant in firms with the largest portion of shares being held by 
blockholders.  
                                               
14
 I only include outside blockholders as a better measure of shareholders’ monitoring strength (i.e., block 
holding insiders are excluded). The data is generously provided by the authors of Dlugosz et al. (2006). 
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Using the data of large-block shareholders, I find consistent evidence that 
corporate governance strength effectively prevents top managers from receiving more 
compensation prior to poor firm performance. This finding also suggests the observed 
phenomenon is more likely driven by top executives’ rent-extracting incentive, and 
represents wealth transfer from shareholders to the management. 
 
4.4 The Implication for long-term performance 
In this section, I explore the relation between CEOs’ unexplained compensation 
and firms’ long-term operational and stock performance. First, if CEOs anticipate 
performance will recover shortly after the shock, they would not have strong incentive to 
get more compensation. As such, getting more compensation prior to deteriorations of 
performance implies that these CEOs anticipate the poor performance will persist. 
Second, the phenomenon may represent agency problems in these firms, which ultimately 
lead to worse performance in the long-run. These two arguments both suggest firms in 
which CEOs receive excess compensation before performance shocks have poorer long 
term performance. 
Table 6 presents the five-year operational and stock performance following the 
year CEOs get abnormal compensation. I form four portfolios in year t according to 
CEO’s unexplained compensation in each firm-year. Specifically, I first run the following 
time series autoregressive model for each firm, and use the residual ε t as the proxy of 
CEO’s unexplained compensation in year t. 
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∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 ∆ ROA t + β2 RET t + β3 TotalComp t-1 + β4 ∆TotalComp t-1 + ε t             
(2) 
In model (2), ∆ ROAt and RETt capture the compensation determined by current 
performance. The inclusion of TotalComp t-1 and ∆ TotalComp t-1 captures the mean-
reversing nature of firm performance and the momentum of compensation changes, 
respectively. Thus, the residual represents any changes in compensation that could not be 
explained by firm performance, mean-reversion or momentum, and therefore may capture 
discretionary adjustment in compensation. Second, I sort firm-years by unexplained 
compensation (i.e., the ε t from model (4)) year by year, and form four different portfolios: 
positive, negative, top quintile and bottom quintile. In particular, the “Positive” portfolio 
contains firm-years in which CEOs receive positive unexplained compensation in year t, 
while CEOs in the “Negative” portfolio receive zero or negative abnormal compensation 
in t. Similarly, the “Top (Bottom) Quintile” portfolio contains firm-years in which CEOs’ 
unexplained compensations rank in the top (bottom) quintile in year t. I further restrict 
samples to include only firms with negative stock returns in t+1, so that the portfolios 
represents the scenarios in which CEOs do or do not get abnormal compensation before 
poor performance. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the raw returns, from year t to year t+5, for each 
portfolio formed in year t. In general, firms in which CEOs get positive unexplained 
compensation outperform in year t, but underperform in subsequent years, compared to 
those in which CEOs do not receive excess compensation. The comparison between the 
top and bottom quintiles exhibits similar but even more striking patterns. I then use 
CAPM and size- BE/ME matched portfolios to control the impact of market performance 
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and other risk factors. Panel B presents the abnormal return estimated from a CAPM 
model. After controlling market performance and systematic risk, the pattern is similar to 
that in Panel A. In Panel C, I follow Fama and French (1993) to form 25 size-BE/ME 
portfolios and estimate abnormal return for each firm-year by adjusting the return of 
corresponding size and BE/ME matched portfolio.15 Panel C shows similar results: the 
stocks of firms in which CEOs get excess compensation prior to poor performance 
outperform in year t, but underperform in the following few years. In addition to stock 
performance, I compare the long-term operational performance in Panel D. Using 
industry-adjusted ROA as the measure of operational performance, I find very similar 
patterns to those for stock performance. Firms that give their CEOs positive unexplained 
compensation in year t have significantly higher ROA in year t and t+1. These firms, 
however, have significantly lower ROA from year t+1 to t+3 compared to their peers. 
Figure 2 presents the trends of cumulative abnormal return (adjusted for size and 
book-to-market ratio matched portfolio return) for the top versus bottom portfolio. It is 
striking that after the performance shocks in t+1, firms in which CEOs get large 
unexplained compensation experience very stagnant recovery in the subsequent five years. 
In contrast, firms in which CEOs do not get excess compensation recover quickly after 
the shocks. 
                                               
15
 Following Fama and French (1993), I independently sort and form reference portfolios for each size and 
BE/ME category once a year in July. Specifically, the sort on size is based on market value of common 
equity of each firm at the end of June, which yields five size portfolios. The sort on BE/ME also yields five 
equal-size portfolios. The book value comes from the latest fiscal year ending in the prior calendar year. 
The market value is from the previous calendar year’s end. The two independent sorts together yield 25 
reference portfolios. I then calculate equally-weighted average stock return for each portfolio in each month 
as the expected return. 
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As discussed earlier, the findings in this section can be interpreted in two different 
ways. First, managers who anticipate persistent poor performance will have stronger 
incentive to obtain more remuneration to offset their future losses. If the poor 
performance is transitory, managers have weak incentive to get more compensation 
because transitory shocks do not seriously affect their future income or wealth. The 
second interpretation comes from the agency theory. The observed phenomenon might 
represent top managers’ rent-extracting behaviors and thus more severe agency problems, 
thereby leading to poorer long-term performance. 
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Chapter 5 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Thus far, I use future abnormal stock returns as the proxy of managers’ private 
information about their firms’ future prospects. However, it is plausible that investors 
consider top executives’ abnormally large compensation to be a signal of the company’s 
exceptional future prospects, thereby leading to market overreaction in the current period 
and subsequent market adjustment to fundamental levels in the next period. Moreover, 
stock return might be a noisy performance measure because it could be influenced by 
factors that are irrelevant to the operation of a company. Therefore, as a robustness test, I 
use accounting performance as an alternative measure of CEO’s private information. 
First, I replace future stock performance in Model (1) by accounting performance, 
which is independent from market reaction. In particular, I use ∆ROA t+1 to replace RET 
t+1 in Model (1) and use ∆ROA t+1 to determine D t+1 (i.e., D t+1 equals 1 if ∆ROA t+1 is 
negative, and 0 otherwise). Using accounting measures does not significantly alter my 
finding; I still find a negative correlation between current excess compensation and future 
performance, conditioned on bad news in the future. This robustness test provides 
evidence that the major finding in this study is not driven by market overreaction and 
subsequent price adjustment.  
However, the public may possess some information about firms’ future 
performance as well. According to the managerial-power hypothesis, managers could not 
take advantage of information that is already known by investors. In the second 
robustness test, I use analysts’ forecast on future operating performance to separate out 
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publicly versus privately known information16. Specifically, I use analysts’ one-year-
ahead forecast as a proxy of public information about a firm’s future performance. On the 
other hand, analysts’ forecast error is the portion of change in performance that is not 
anticipated by the analysts or the public. Specifically, I use analysts’ consensus (median) 
forecasts on a firm’s earnings per share in year t+1, measured at the fourth month of 
fiscal year t+1, as the best estimation of a firm’s future performance using publicly 
available information17. The analyst forecast data is collected from the I/B/E/S database. 
Analysts’ expectation of the change in performance (AFt+1) is defined as the consensus 
forecast on earnings per share in year t+1 minus the actual earnings per share in year t, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal year t. AFE t+1 is measured as the actual 
earnings per share in year t+1 minus the consensus (median) analysts’ forecast made 
three months after fiscal year end of t, and scaled by the stock price at fiscal year-end of t. 
 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 AF t+1 + β2 D AF,t+1 + β3 AF t+1 * D AF,t+1 + β4 AFE t+1 +β5 D AFE, t+1 
+ β6 AFE t+1 * D AFE,t+1 + β7 ∆ ROA t  + β8 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3  + β9 RET t  + β10 RET t-1,t-3  
+ β11 Size t  + β12 ME/BE t + β13 Leverage t + β14 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     (3) 
 
Table 7 presents the results for model (3). In column (1), I substitute the change in 
future performance in the original model with analysts’ “anticipated” change in future 
performance, AFt+1. The result shows that current compensation is not significantly 
correlated with analysts’ expected change in future performance. In contrast, in column 
                                               
16
 The underlying assumption is: analysts are sophisticated investors, and should incorporate most publicly 
available information in their earnings forecasts. 
17
 I choose the fourth month of year t+1 because most executives’ compensation packages have been 
determined and disclosed in proxy statements and 10Ks by this time. Thus, analysts’ forecast at this time 
can be an appropriate proxy of public’s expectation on a firm’s future performance when executives’ 
current compensation is determined. 
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(2) I substitute the change in future performance by AFEt+1, the part of performance 
change that is not anticipated by analysts. I find managers’ current compensation is 
significantly and negatively associated with AFEt+1 when there is forthcoming bad news 
(β4 + β6 =-1.24, F=6.92, p<0.1). Column (3) includes both analysts’ expected and 
unexpected changes in performance, and the result holds. This finding is consistent with 
the theoretical argument that top executives are concerned about public outrage when 
they extract rents from their companies. It implies that managers’ rent-seeking behavior 
relies on their information advantage over investors, suggesting that more transparent 
disclosure of managers’ private information about firms’ future prospects would reduce 
such rent-extracting behavior. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Top executives have incentive to acquire more compensation when they anticipate 
deteriorations of firm performance in the future. Compared to insider trading, first, this 
approach is less subjected to legal jeopardy. Second, the determination of executive 
compensation usually involves unverifiable “soft” information, such as subjective (Baker 
et al. 1994; Gibbs et al. 2004), non-financial (Ittner and Larcker 1998; Hayes and 
Schaefer 2000), or individual performance measures (Bushman et al. 1996), leaving 
plenty of space for manipulation (see Bebchuk and Fried 2004 for a more detailed 
discussion). Therefore, it is difficult for investors to detect or prevent such behavior ex 
ante (i.e., before decreases of performance), and it is easy for managers to justify the 
excess pay when investigated by investors or regulators. 
Using U.S. compensation data, I find empirical evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that CEOs get more compensation immediately prior to poor performance. 
Interestingly, I find the abnormal compensation arrangement is most prevalent when 
insiders sell large amounts of stock or when the management teams exercise large 
amounts of options, both of which being signals that executives possess foreknowledge 
about forthcoming poor firm performance.  
Consistent with managers’ rent-seeking explanation, the CEO’s power and the 
quality of corporate governance significantly influences the prevalence of this behavior. 
Specifically, the abnormal compensation arrangement is most prevalent in firms where 
top managers have dominating power over the boards. Moreover, I find the phenomenon 
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more significant in firms that receive less intensive monitoring, but insignificant in those 
intensively scrutinized by shareholders. Last, I find the phenomenon is associated with 
poorer long-term stock and operating performance. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study that examines whether managers get more 
compensation in response to their foreknowledge about future performance. Prior studies 
have documented that managers possess foreknowledge about firms’ future prospects, 
and sell their stock holdings (Ke et al. 2003) or exercise options (Huddart and Lang 2003) 
when they anticipate decreases in firm performance. My study adds to this line of 
literature by documenting another channel through which managers could benefit from 
their private information. These rent-extracting behaviors represent severe agency 
problems because they directly transfer wealth from shareholders to managers. Such 
wealth transfer further impedes shareholders’ benefit, especially during economic or 
industry downturns.  
This study also adds to the literature on executive compensation. When examining 
pay-performance relations, prior studies mainly focus on how current and past 
performance determines compensation, and how compensation drives future performance. 
This study sheds new light on this literature by showing a more complex relation, in 
which information about future performance could be incorporated in the compensation 
determination process. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables 
  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of major variables used in this study. The full 
sample consists of 13,480 firm-year observations.  
 
Variable N Mean S. D. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
∆ TotalComp t 13,479 0.40 6.75 -31.66 -0.70 0.27 1.66 29.55 
TotalComp t-1 13,479 6.16 8.15 1.00 2.20 3.68 6.53 56.01 
Abn_RET t+1 13,479 0.02 0.39 -0.77 -0.22 -0.02 0.18 1.57 
D t+1 13,479 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
RET t 13,479 0.17 0.47 -0.80 -0.11 0.11 0.37 2.14 
RET t-1, t-3 13,479 0.23 0.32 -0.40 0.04 0.16 0.34 1.62 
∆ROA t 13,479 -2.85E-3 0.08 -0.36 -0.02 6.11E-4 0.02 0.31 
∆ROA t-1, t-3 13,479 -2.77E-3 0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -4.43E-4 0.01 0.16 
Size t 13,479 7.43 1.72 4.10 6.16 7.26 8.57 12.15 
ME/BE t 13,479 3.13 3.11 -4.26 1.55 2.27 3.62 20.42 
Leverage t 13,479 0.56 0.23 0.09 0.40 0.57 0.71 1.08 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TotalComp: TDC1 in ExecuComp, contains salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of option granted (using Black-Scholes), and all other pay 
∆ TotalComp t = (TotalComp t- TotalComp t-1)/Salary t-1 
Abn_RET t+1: Abnormal stock return in year t+1, estimated by the Fama-French three factor 
model. 
D t+1: A dummy variable that equals 1 if Abn_RET t+1 is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.  
RET t : Monthly compounded stock return in fiscal year t 
RET t-1,  t-3 : Average annual (monthly compounded) return from t-3 to t-1. 
∆ ROA t: ROA t - ROA t-1, ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total asset at the beginning of year t. 
∆ROA t-1, t-3 : Average change of ROA from t-3 to t-1. 
Size t: Natural log of total asset at the beginning of year t 
ME/BE t: Market value of equity divided by book value of equity, measured at the beginning of 
year t 
Leverage t: Total liability divided by total asset, measured at the beginning of year t 
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TABLE 2 
 Regression of Change in Total Direct Compensation on Future Performance 
 
This table shows the result of regressing change in total direct compensation on future performance, while 
controlling current and past performance. The sample includes 13,480 firm-year observations spanning from 1993 to 
2005. Column (1) presents the result of the pooled regression model. Column (2) presents the result from Fama-
MacBeth’s year-by-year regression procedure, with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation. Column (3) presents 
the result of the industry- and year-fixed effect model, with standard errors clustered by firm. Please refer to Table 1 
for variable definitions. ***, **, * statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed). t statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 Abn_RET t+1 + β2 D t+1 + β3  Abn_RET t+1 *D t+1 + β4 ∆ ROA t   
+ β5 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3  + β6 RET t  + β7 RET t-1,t-3  + β8 Size t  + β9 ME/BE t  
+ β10 Leverage t  + β11 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     
 
  
 Pooled 
Regression 
(1) 
Fama-MacBeth 
Regression 
(2) 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
(3) 
Intercept α0  
-3.77 *** 
(-13.25) 
-3.06 *** 
(-4.44) 
-6.66 *** 
(-10.60) 
Abn_RET t+1 β1 + 
1.22 *** 
(5.42) 
0.72 ** 
(2.23) 
0.72 *** 
(2.70) 
D t+1 β2  
-0.31 ** 
(-2.00) 
-0.42 ** 
(-2.71) 
-0.35 ** 
(-2.56) 
Abn_RET t+1 
 
* D t+1 
β3 - 
-3.37 *** 
(-7.47) 
-2.76 ** 
(-2.66) 
-2.62 *** 
(-5.07) 
∆ ROA t   β4 + 
0.22 
(0.30) 
0.71 
(0.83) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β5 + 
2.08 
(1.40) 
1.74 
(1.23) 
1.78 
(0.84) 
RET t β6 + 
2.22 *** 
(19.47) 
2.13 *** 
(14.30) 
2.23 *** 
(11.13) 
RET t-1, t-3 β7 + 
2.02 *** 
(10.97) 
1.94 *** 
(5.61) 
1.91 *** 
(7.78) 
Size t β8  
0.79 *** 
(19.66) 
0.72 *** 
(6.60) 
0.84 *** 
(14.05) 
ME/BE t β9  
0.21 *** 
(11.80) 
0.13 *** 
(3.52) 
0.20 *** 
(5.43) 
Leverage t β10  
-1.92 *** 
(-6.65) 
-1.58 *** 
(-6.23) 
-1.67 *** 
(-4.11) 
TotalComp t-1 β11 - 
-0.39 *** 
(-57.21) 
-0.41 *** 
(-10.47) 
-0.42 *** 
(-15.51) 
Year and Industry Fixed 
Effect  No No Yes 
Firm Clusters  No No Yes 
β1  +β3  (F-statistic) - -2.15 *** (31.85)  
-1.90 *** 
(19.63) 
β1  +β3  (t-statistic) -  -2.04 *** (-2.52)  
N   13,479 13,479 13,479 
Adj. R-Square   0.2148 0.2396 0.2325 
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TABLE 3 
Regression of Change in Total Direct Compensation on Future Performance- 
Insider Trading and Option Exercise 
 
This table presents the regression results for subgroups with different levels of insider trading activities and 
option exercise. Panel A presents the summary statistics for insider trading and option exercise. In Panel B, 
I split the sample by insider trading activities. Column (1) and (2) in Panel B present results for subgroups 
with CEOs net selling and net purchasing, respectively. Similarly, column (3) and (4) in Panel B present 
results for subgroups with net selling and net purchasing trading activities by other non-CEO insider 
officers, respectively. In Panel C, I split the sample according to the amount (column (1) to (3)), and the 
percentage (column (4) to (6)) of option exercised by the management team in fiscal year t. Please refer to 
Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-
tailed). t statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  
 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 Abn_RET t+1 + β2 D t+1 + β3  Abn_RET t+1 *D t+1 + β4 ∆ ROA t   
+ β5 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3  + β6 RET t  + β7 RET t-1,t-3  + β8 Size t  + β9 ME/BE t  
+ β10 Leverage t  + β11 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     
  
   
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Insider Trading and Option Exercise 
 
Variable N Mean S. D. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
CEO’s Net Selling 3,613 716,263 
72.22E
5 0 41,550 
126,62
2 
360,00
0 
38.42E
7 
CEO’s Net Purchase 1,102 84,182 451,046 0 2,200 10,000 30,000 
75.00E
5 
Other Officers’ Net Selling 9,415 894,081 
91.40E
5 0 30,310 
116,61
3 
379,24
0 
52.05E
7 
Other Officers’ Net 
Purchase 1,560 883,66 
628,75
1 0 1640 6518 25,005 
17.07E
6 
Amount of Option 
Exercised 13,480 42.00 292.43 0 0 7.06 32.45 30,000 
% of Option Exercised 12,947 0.14 0.19 0 0 0.06 0.19 1.00 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Regression Results for Firm-Years with Different Amount of Insider 
Trading Activities 
 
 
 
CEO’s Transactions Other Officers’ Transactions 
 
 
 
Net Sell 
 (1) 
Net Purchase 
(2) 
Net Sell 
 (3) 
Net Purchase 
(4) 
Intercept α0  
-8.48 *** 
(-5.48) 
-7.48 *** 
(-4.69) 
-6.83 *** 
(-7.52) 
-3.48 ** 
(-2.56) 
Abn_RET t+1 β1 + 
1.23 * 
(1.94) 
0.99 
(1.35) 
1.05 *** 
(2.83) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
D t+1 β2  
-0.42 
(-1.28) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.37 ** 
(-2.11) 
-0.19 
(-0.57) 
Abn_RET t+1 * 
D t+1 
β3 - 
-4.48 *** 
(-3.65) 
-1.35 
(-0.95) 
-3.61 *** 
(-5.37) 
-0.96 
(-0.92) 
∆ ROA t   β4 + 
2.76 
(1.04) 
-4.50 * 
(-1.96) 
-0.23 
(-0.14) 
0.97 
(0.63) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β5 + 
0.45 
(0.09) 
1.43 
(0.26) 
0.66 
(0.22) 
1.99 
(0.57) 
RET t β6 + 
2.82 *** 
(6.55) 
1.90 *** 
(4.42) 
2.40 *** 
(9.15) 
1.13 *** 
(2.99) 
RET t-1, t-3 β7 + 
2.27 *** 
(4.54) 
0.66 
(0.92) 
2.13 *** 
(6.71) 
0.42 
(0.91) 
Size t β8  
0.99 *** 
(7.91) 
0.82 *** 
(4.64) 
0.89 *** 
(11.80) 
0.50 *** 
(3.58) 
ME/BE t β9  
0.23 *** 
(3.46) 
0.18 * 
(1.66) 
0.21 *** 
(4.61) 
0.16 ** 
(2.37) 
Leverage t β10  
-1.58 * 
(-1.88) 
-1.61 
(-1.35) 
-1.48 *** 
(-2.77) 
-1.47 
(-1.61) 
TotalComp t-1 β11 - 
-0.37 *** 
(-8.38) 
-0.48 *** 
(-6.61) 
-0.41 *** 
(-12.78) 
-0.46 *** 
(-6.58) 
Year  and Industry 
Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
β
 1 + β 3 (F-statistic) - -3.25 *** (10.21) 
-0.36 
(0.10) 
-2.56 *** 
(21.60) 
-0.73 
(0.74) 
N   3,613 1,099 9,414 1,545 
Adj. R-Square  0.1892 0.3629 0.2182 0.3587 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Regression Results for Firm-Years with Different Amount of Option 
Exercised 
 
 
 
 
Amount of Option Exercised % of Option Exercised 
 
 
 
Large 
(1) 
Medium 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
Large 
(4) 
Medium 
(5) 
Small 
(6) 
Intercept α0  
-9.15 *** 
(-6.54) 
-3.98 *** 
(-5.01) 
-4.89 *** 
(-4.80) 
-8.48 *** 
(-6.70) 
-5.86 *** 
(-7.56) 
-4.89 *** 
(-4.80) 
Abn_RET t+1 β1 + 
1.51 * 
(1.87) 
0.74 ** 
(2.18) 
-0.14 
(-0.43) 
1.49 ** 
(2.17) 
0.93 ** 
(2.13) 
-0.14 
(-0.43) 
D t+1 β2  
-0.99 *** 
(-2.57) 
-0.07 
(-0.44) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
-0.61 * 
(-1.79) 
-0.31 
(-1.47) 
-0.21 
(-0.83) 
Abn_RET t+1 * 
D t+1 
β3 - 
-5.43 *** 
(-3.39) 
-2.22 *** 
(-3.34) 
-0.51 
(-0.65) 
-4.55 *** 
(-3.31) 
-3.08 *** 
(-3.86) 
-0.51 
(-0.65) 
∆ ROA t   β4 + 
0.78 
(0.25) 
0.47 
(0.35) 
-1.74 
(-1.56) 
0.62 
(0.23) 
0.37 
(0.21) 
-1.74 
(-1.56) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β5 + 
0.93 
(0.17) 
0.68 
(0.25) 
2.86 
(1.23) 
3.03 
(0.63) 
-0.97 
(-0.27) 
2.86 
(1.23) 
RET t β6 + 
3.02 *** 
(6.45) 
1.24 *** 
(6.25) 
1.25 *** 
(5.46) 
2.80 *** 
(6.96) 
1.89 *** 
(6.34) 
1.25 *** 
(5.46) 
RET t-1, t-3 β7 + 
2.30 *** 
(3.52) 
1.20 *** 
(3.71) 
0.52 * 
(1.69) 
2.17 *** 
(3.65) 
1.73 *** 
(4.52) 
0.52 * 
(1.69) 
Size t β8  
0.98 *** 
(6.63) 
0.66 *** 
(9.99) 
0.58 *** 
(6.10) 
0.81 *** 
(6.42) 
0.95 *** 
(11.88) 
0.58 *** 
(6.10) 
ME/BE t β9  
0.26 *** 
(3.36) 
0.12 *** 
(3.19) 
0.07  
(1.60) 
0.20 *** 
(2.93) 
0.23 *** 
(4.62) 
0.07  
(1.60) 
Leverage t β10  
-1.70 
(-1.48) 
-1.15 *** 
(-2.63) 
-0.21 
(-0.33) 
-0.10 
(-0.11) 
-3.01 *** 
(-5.21) 
-0.21 
(-0.33) 
TotalComp t-1 β11 - 
-0.39 *** 
(-9.84) 
-0.49 *** 
(-13.69) 
-0.47 *** 
(-8.23) 
-0.31 *** 
(-5.84) 
-0.47 *** 
(-14.65) 
-0.47 *** 
(-8.23) 
Year  and Industry 
Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
β
 1 + β 3 (F-statistic) - -3.92 *** (8.60) 
-1.48 *** 
(7.69) 
-0.65 
(0.88) 
-3.06 *** 
(7.47) 
-2.15 *** 
(10.17) 
-0.65 
(0.88) 
N   3,406 6,201 3,872 3,279 3,872 3,872 
Adj. R-Square  0.1987 0.2958 0.3539 0.1619 0.2666 0.3539 
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TABLE 4 
Regression of Change in Total Direct Compensation on Future Performance- 
Subgroups by CEO’s Power 
 
This table presents the regression results for subgroups with different levels of CEO power. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics for CEOs’ stock holdings and CEO-Chairman duality. Stock holdings are 
measured as the value of CEO’s stock at the end of year t-1. In Panel B, column (1), (2) and (3) present 
results for subgroups in which CEOs hold large (top 25%), medium (middle 50%) and small (bottom 25%) 
amount of stocks. Column (4) and (5) present the result for dual-CEOs (CEOs who are also chairmen) and 
non-dual CEOs. Please refer to Table 1 for other variable definitions. ***, **, * statistically distinct from 0 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed). t statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year.  
 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 RET t+1 + β2 D t+1 + β3  RET t+1 *D t+1 + β4 ∆ ROA t  + β5 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3   
+ β6 RET t  + β7 RET t-1,t-3  + β8 Size t  + β9 ME/BE t + β10 Leverage t  
+ β11 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for CEO’s Stock Holding 
 
Variable N Mean S. D. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Stock Holding 12,982 63,821 213,459 0 2,298 8,614 30,088 17.01E5 
CEO-Chairman 
Duality 13,479 0.71 0.46 0 0 1 1 1 
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TABLE 4 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Regression Results for Firm-Years with Different CEO Power 
 
 
 
 CEO Stock Holding CEO-Chairman Duality 
 
 
 Large 
(1) 
Medium 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
Dual 
CEOs 
(4) 
Non-dual 
CEOs 
(5) 
Intercept α0  
-8.79 *** 
(-6.79) 
-6.51 *** 
(-9.17) 
-0.89 
(-0.87) 
-6.68 *** 
(-9.04) 
-5.04 *** 
(-4.93) 
Abn_RET t+1 β1 + 
1.71 ** 
(2.130 
0.53 
(1.52) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.87 *** 
(2.60) 
0.36 
(0.85) 
D t+1 β2  
-0.61 
(-1.57) 
-0.46 *** 
(-2.69) 
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
-0.37 ** 
(-2.19) 
-0.34 
(-1.43) 
Abn_RET t+1 * 
D t+1 
β3 - 
-5.53 *** 
(-3.59) 
-2.99 *** 
(-4.48) 
0.26 
(0.39) 
-3.04 *** 
(-4.70) 
-1.68 * 
(-1.89) 
∆ ROA t   β4 + 
-1.16 
(-0.40) 
1.74 
(1.18) 
1.01 
(0.86) 
1.31 
(0.98) 
-1.87 
(-0.96) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β5 + 
-1.57 
(-0.22) 
3.01 
(1.08) 
4.74 * 
(1.86) 
3.90 
(1.41) 
-0.67 
(-0.20) 
RET t β6 + 
3.09 *** 
(6.52) 
1.54 *** 
(6.57) 
1.44 *** 
(6.14) 
2.29 *** 
(9.52) 
2.02 *** 
(5.94) 
RET t-1, t-3 β7 + 
2.80 *** 
(4.52) 
1.83 *** 
(5.11) 
0.99 *** 
(3.55) 
1.88 *** 
(5.86) 
1.85 *** 
(4.96) 
Size t β8  
0.85 *** 
(5.97) 
0.84 *** 
(10.99) 
0.51 *** 
(4.87) 
0.77 *** 
(11.36) 
1.03 *** 
(8.08) 
ME/BE t β9  
0.10 
(1.62) 
0.25 *** 
(5.27) 
0.16 *** 
(3.07) 
0.19 *** 
(4.89) 
0.24 *** 
(2.85) 
Leverage t β10  
-0.15 
(-0.18) 
-2.91 *** 
(-5.36) 
-1.89 *** 
(-3.24) 
-1.45 *** 
(-3.43) 
-2.27 *** 
(-2.74) 
TotalComp t-1 β11 - 
-0.30 *** 
(-8.03) 
-0.58 *** 
(-18.62) 
-0.57 *** 
(-12.81) 
-0.40 *** 
(-13.95) 
-0.48 *** 
(-8.55) 
Year  and Industry 
Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
β
 1 + β 3 (F-statistic) - -3.82 *** (9.25) 
-2.46 *** 
(19.05) 
0.31 
(0.39) 
-2.17 *** 
(17.10) 
-1.32 * 
(2.94) 
N   3,317 6,497 3,167 9,557 3,922 
Adj. R-Square  0.1580 0.3583 0.4605 0.2194 0.3014 
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TABLE 5 
Regression of Change in Total Direct Compensation on Future Performance- 
Subgroups by Corporate Governance Strength 
 
This table presents the regression results for subgroups with different levels of corporate governance 
strength. Panel A shows the summary statistics of block shareholder variables. In Panel B, I use the 
presence of large-block shareholders as the proxy of shareholders’ monitoring strength. Column (1), (2) 
and (3) in Panel B present results for subgroups with large (top 25%), medium (middle 50%) and small (top 
25%) amount of block shareholders. Similarly, column (4), (5) and (6) in Panel B present results for 
subgroups with large (top 25%), medium (middle 50%) and small (top 25%) percentage of shares held by 
block shareholders. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * statistically distinct from 0 at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed). t statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year.  
 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 RET t+1 + β2 D t+1 + β3  RET t+1 *D t+1 + β4 ∆ ROA t  + β5 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3   
+ β6 RET t  + β7 RET t-1,t-3  + β8 Size t  + β9 ME/BE t + β10 Leverage t  
+ β11 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Governance Index and Block Shareholders 
 
Variable N Mean S. D. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
# of Block Shareholders 5,050 2.25 1.59 0 1 2 3 11 
Shares Owned by Block 
Shareholders (%) 5,050 21.50 16.35 0 8.38 19.50 31.40 99.72 
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TABLE 5 (cont.) 
Panel B: Block Holding Shareholders 
  
 
Number of Block Shareholders Shares Owned by Block Shareholders 
  
 
Large 
(1) 
Medium 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
Large 
(4) 
Medium 
(5) 
Small 
(6) 
Intercept α0  
-4.69 *** 
(-3.14) 
-6.57 *** 
(-4.23) 
-6.14 ** 
(-2.53) 
-4.66 *** 
(-3.45) 
-6.83 ** 
(-2.04) 
-3.63 
(-1.39) 
Abn_RET t+1 β1 + 
0.58 
(0.96) 
1.44 ** 
(2.13) 
1.48 
(1.28) 
0.38 
(0.62) 
1.20 ** 
(2.02) 
2.65 * 
(1.70) 
D t+1 β2  
0.47 
(1.04) 
-0.61 
(-1.43) 
-0.88 
(-1.47) 
-0.35 
(-0.75) 
-0.53 
(-1.41) 
-0.50 
(-0.79) 
Abn_RET t+1 * 
D t+1 
β3 - 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-5.24 *** 
(-3.74) 
-5.98 *** 
(-2.72) 
-0.62 
(-0.51) 
-4.89 *** 
(-3.47) 
-7.27 *** 
(-3.00) 
∆ ROA t   β4 + 
0.24 
(0.07) 
1.59 
(0.59) 
1.41 
(0.24) 
-1.43 
(-0.52) 
3.97 
(1.43) 
-1.70 
(-0.24) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β5 + 
13.42 ** 
(2.07) 
-1.24 
(-0.18) 
-12.04 
(-0.60) 
7.84 
(1.31) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-9.87 
(-0.42) 
RET t β6 + 
1.49 *** 
(3.65) 
2.42 *** 
(5.86) 
2.96 *** 
(3.48) 
1.36 *** 
(3.19) 
2.99 *** 
(6.32) 
2.06 ** 
(2.39) 
RET t-1, t-3 β7 + 
2.78 *** 
(2.67) 
3.07 *** 
(3.71) 
4.93 *** 
(3.72) 
1.70 ** 
(2.02) 
4.70 *** 
(5.01) 
3.48 *** 
(2.60) 
Size t β8  
0.55 *** 
(2.62) 
0.87 *** 
(5.56) 
1.03 *** 
(4.63) 
0.52 ** 
(2.52) 
0.80 *** 
(5.30) 
1.13 *** 
(4.72) 
ME/BE t β9  
0.13 * 
(1.68) 
0.22 ** 
(2.39) 
0.34 ** 
(2.30) 
0.13 * 
(1.64) 
0.30 *** 
(3.55) 
2.94 * 
(1.71) 
Leverage t β10  
0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.96 
(-0.91) 
-4.49 
(-1.41) 
0.95 
(0.79) 
-1.76 
(-1.60) 
-2.39 
(-0.64) 
TotalComp t-1 β11 - 
-0.58 *** 
(-5.56) 
-0.40 *** 
(-6.40) 
-0.42 *** 
(-6.10) 
-0.55 *** 
(-6.24) 
-0.46 *** 
(-7.18) 
-0.36 *** 
(-4.39) 
Year  and Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
β
 1 + β 3 (F-Value)  0.59 (0.34) 
-3.80 *** 
(10.24) 
-4.50*** 
(6.56) 
-0.24 
(0.06) 
-3.69 *** 
(9.58) 
-4.62 ** 
(6.14) 
N   1,105 2,275 1,328 1,163 2,355 1,190 
Adj. R-Square  0.3358 0.2240 0.2434 0.3175 0.2675 0.2187 
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Table 6 
Long-term Stock and Accounting Performance after CEOs Get Abnormal Compensation 
 
This table presents the comparison of long-term stock and accounting performance between firms in which CEOs do 
or do not get excess (unexplained) compensation prior to poor performance. Unexplained compensation is 
determined by the following firm-specific time-series AR(1) model. ∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 ∆ ROA t + β2 RET t + 
β3 TotalComp t-1 + β4 ∆TotalComp t-1 + ε t  
The “Positive” column reports forward-looking performance for firm-year observations with positive unexplained 
compensation in year t. In contrast, “Negative” column reports forward-looking performance for those with negative 
unexplained compensation in year t. Similarly, “Top (Bottom) Quintile” column contains those with unexplained 
compensation ranked in the top (bottom) quintile in year t. Panel A reports the comparison of annual raw return. 
Panel B reports the comparison of abnormal return from a CAPM model. Panel C presents the comparison of 
abnormal return computed by subtracting the size and book-to-market ratio matched portfolio return from a firm’s 
raw return. Following Fama and French (1993), I independently sort and form reference portfolios for each size and 
BE/ME category once a year in July. Specifically, the sort on size is based on market value of common equity of 
each firm at the end of June, which yields five size portfolios. The sort on BE/ME also yields five equal-size 
portfolios. The book value comes from the latest fiscal year ending in the prior calendar year. The market value is 
from the previous calendar year end. The two independent sorts together yield 25 reference portfolios. I then 
calculate equally-weighted average stock return for each portfolio in each month as the expected return. Lastly, 
Panel D presents the comparison of industry-adjusted ROA. Industry-adjusted ROA is calculated by subtracting the 
mean ROA of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code from a firm’s ROA. ***, **, * statistically distinct from 0 at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed). 
 
Panel A: Comparison of Annual Raw Returns between Subgroups formed by Unexplained 
Compensation 
 
 Positive Negative Difference (t-statistic) 
Top 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
t 0.1667 0.1581 0.0086 (0.78) 0.1931 0.1431 
0.05*** 
(2.81) 
t+1 -0.2789 -0.2556 -0.0233 *** (-4.60) -0.2915 -0.2636 
-0.0279 *** 
(-3.38) 
t+2 0.1347 0.1864 -0.0517 *** (-3.70) 0.1350 0.2028 
-0.0678 *** 
(-2.99) 
t+3 0.1257 0.1646 -0.0389 *** (-2.59) 0.1269 0.2038 
-0.0769 *** 
(-3.10) 
t+4 0.1002 0.1067 -0.0065 (-0.43) 0.0874 0.1448 
-0.0574 ** 
(-2.32) 
t+5 0.1391 0.1462 -0.0071 (-0.44) 0.1465 0.1583 
-0.0118 
(-0.45) 
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of Abnormal Returns (Using CAPM) between Subgroups formed by 
Unexplained Compensation  
 
 
Positive Negative Difference (t-statistic) 
Top 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
t 0.0454 0.0102 0.0352 *** (3.73) 0.0651 0.0034 
0.0617 *** 
(4.06) 
t+1 -0.2287 -0.2396 0.0109 (1.62) -0.2411 -0.2236 
-0.0175 
(-1.57) 
t+2 0.0226 0.0501 -0.0275 ** (-2.50) 0.0022 0.0759 
-0.0737 *** 
(-4.23) 
t+3 0.0184 0.0519 -0.0335 *** (-2.72) 0.0087 0.0887 
-0.08 *** 
(-4.02) 
t+4 0.0148 0.0286 -0.0138 (-1.09) -0.0010 0.0542 
-0.0552 *** 
(-2.76) 
t+5 0.0319 0.0476 -0.0157 (-1.20) 0.0426 0.0589 
-0.0163 
(-0.78) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Comparison of Abnormal Returns (Using Size and BE/ME Matched Portfolio) 
between Subgroups formed by Unexplained Compensation 
 
 
Positive Negative Difference (t-statistic) 
Top 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
t 0.0443 0.0127 0.0316 *** (3.33) 0.0616 0.0123 
0.0493 *** 
(3.23) 
t+1 -0.2309 -0.2303 -0.0006 (-0.07) -0.2460 -0.2183 
-0.0277 ** 
(-2.07) 
t+2 0.0166 0.0439 -0.0273 ** (-2.39) 0.0222 0.0695 
-0.0473 *** 
(-2.59) 
t+3 0.0089 0.0269 -0.018 (-1.46) 0.0113 0.0507 
-0.0394 ** 
(-2.01) 
t+4 0.0044 0.0311 -0.0267 ** (-2.10) -0.0079 0.0618 
-0.0697 *** 
(-3.55) 
t+5 0.0064 0.0315 -0.0251 * (-1.85) 0.0279 0.0478 
-0.0199 
(-0.98) 
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
Panel D: Comparison of Industry-Adjusted ROA between Subgroups formed by 
Unexplained Compensation 
 
 
Positive Negative Difference (t-statistic) 
Top 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
t 0.0808 0.0728 0.008 *** (-2.60) 0.0944 0.0799 
0.0145 *** 
(2.85) 
t+1 0.0651 0.0586 0.0065 * (1.83) 0.0762 0.0685 
0.0077 ** 
(2.28) 
t+2 0.0568 0.0578 -0.001 (0.26) 0.0647 0.0627 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
t+3 0.0542 0.0642 -0.01 ** (-2.49) 0.0608 0.0636 
-0.0028 
(-0.43) 
t+4 0.0579 0.0693 -0.0114 *** (-2.65) 0.0671 0.0763 
-0.0092 
(-1.31) 
t+5 0.0545 0.0683 -0.0138 *** (2.96) 0.0618 0.0704 
-0.0086 
(-1.18) 
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TABLE 7 
Regression of Change in Total Direct Compensation on Future Performance- Analyst 
Forecast and Analyst Forecast Errors 
 
In this table, I use analysts’ consensus forecast on earnings per share as the proxy of public information 
about firms’ future performance. AF t+1 is analysts’ consensus (median) forecast on a firm’s earnings per 
share in year t+1, measured in the fourth month of fiscal year t+1, minus the actual earnings per share in t 
and scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal year t. This variable measures analysts’ expectation on 
the change in firm performance in year t+1. D
 AF, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if AF t+1 is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. AFE t+1 is analysts’ forecast error on earnings per share in t+1, defined as the actual 
earnings per share in t+1 minus analysts’ consensus (median) forecast three months after the fiscal year 
end of t and scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal year t. D
 AFE, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if AFE t+1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * 
statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed). t statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  
 
∆ TotalComp t = α0 + β1 AF t+1 + β2 D AF,t+1 + β3 AF t+1 * D AF,t+1 + β4 AFE t+1 +β5 D AFE, t+1 
+ β6 AFE t+1 * D AFE,t+1 + β7 ∆ ROA t  + β8 ∆ ROA t-1,t-3  + β9 RET t  + β10 RET t-1,t-3  + β11 
Size t  + β12 ME/BE t + β13 Leverage t + β14 TotalComp t-1 +  ε t     
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TABLE 7 (cont.) 
 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept α0  
-6.63 *** 
(-9.07) 
-6.06 *** 
(-7.32) 
-6.47 *** 
(-9.06) 
AF t+1 β1  0.26 (0.31)  
-0.02 
(-0.02) 
D
 AF, t+1 β2  
0.44 ** 
(2.33)  
0.48 ** 
(2.45) 
AF t+1 * D AF,t+1 β3 - 
-0.03 
(-0.01)  
0.57 
(0.24) 
AFE t+1 β4   2.27 (1.43) 
2.40 
(1.38) 
D
 AFE, t+1 β5   
-0.11 
(-0.95) 
-0.13 
(-1.09) 
AFE t+1 * D AFE, t+1 β6 -  -3.51 ** (-2.11) 
-3.26 * 
(-1.75) 
∆ ROA t   β7 + 1.06 (0.79) 
1.31 
(0.99) 
0.84 
(0.61) 
∆ ROA t -1, t-3  β8 + 
1.27 
(0.49) 
2.09 
(0.82) 
1.24 
(0.46) 
RET t β9 + 
2.32 *** 
(10.44) 
2.21 *** 
(9.73) 
2.30 *** 
(9.79) 
RET t-1, t-3 β10 + 
1.87 *** 
(6.94) 
1.80 *** 
(6.88) 
1.80 *** 
(6.49) 
Size t β11  
0.81 *** 
(12.08) 
0.81 *** 
(12.13) 
0.80 *** 
(11.88) 
ME/BE t β12  0.23 *** (5.14) 
0.22 *** 
(5.10) 
0.23 *** 
(5.12) 
Leverage t β 13  
-1.44 *** 
(-2.86) 
-1.50 *** 
(-3.01) 
-1.48 *** 
(-2.87) 
TotalComp t-1 β 14 - 
-0.43 *** 
(-13.90) 
-0.42 *** 
(-13.64) 
-0.43 *** 
(-13.75) 
Year  and Industry Fixed 
Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters  Yes Yes Yes 
Analyst Forecast  
β
 1 + β 3  
- 
0.23 
(0.01)  
0.55 
(0.06) 
Analyst Forecast Error  
β
 4 + β 6  
-  
-1.24 *** 
(6.92) 
-0.86 ** 
(5.25) 
N 
 
 10,959 10,814 10,430 
Adj. R-Square 
 
 0.2492 0.2409 0.2476 
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FIGURES 
  
FIGURE 1 
Illustration of the Negative Association between Pay and Future Poor Performance 
 
This figure illustrates the correlation between CEOs unexplained current compensation and future 
performance. When CEOs foresee bad news in the next period, they would get more (unexplained) 
compensation in the current period to offset anticipated losses in personal wealth. The solid line shows 
this negative correlation between current unexplained compensation and future performance. In contrast, 
when there is good news in the future, current unexplained compensation and future performance are 
positively correlated (the dotted line) due to the use of unobservable nonfinancial performance measures 
in compensation schemes (e.g., Hayes and Schaefer, 2000). 
  
Performance t+1
Unexplained 
Compensation t
Good NewsBad News
52 
 
FIGURE 2 
Five-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
This figure presents the cumulative abnormal return in the five-year period from t+1 to t+5. The sample 
contains only firm-year observations that have negative RET in year t+1, so that the curves allow us to 
compare long-term performance between subgroups where CEOs do or do not get abnormal 
compensation prior to performance shocks. “Top Quintile” is a subset of sample that contains firm-year 
observations with the highest 20% of abnormal compensation in year t, while “Bottom Quintile” contains 
those with lowest 20% of abnormal compensation in t. Abnormal compensation is estimated as the 
residual of the following firm-specific time series AR(1) model regressing CEO’s compensation on firm 
performance.  ∆ Comp t = α0 + β1 ∆ ROA t + β2 RET t + β3 Comp t-1 + β4 ∆ Comp t-1 + ε t. Total Accrual is 
measured as net income minus net operating cash flow, scaled by total assets at the beginning of fiscal 
year. 
 
Following Fama and French (1993), I independently sort and form reference portfolios for each size and 
BE/ME category once a year in July. Specifically, the sort on size is based on market value of common 
equity of each firm at the end of June, which yields five size portfolios. The sort on BE/ME also yields 
five equal-size portfolios. The book value comes from the latest fiscal year ending in the prior calendar 
year. The market value is from the previous calendar year end. The two independent sorts together yield 
25 reference portfolios. I then calculate equally-weighted average stock return for each portfolio in each 
month as the expected return. 
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